Restoring Mind-Brain Supervenience: A Proposal :: Philosophy Philosophical Papers

Restoring Mind-Brain Supervenience A intentABSTRACT In this paper I see to it the claim that moral causation at least for cases involving the production of goal-directed behavior is accomplishable only if mind/ sensation supervenience obtains, and suggest that in spite of altogether the bad press it has received in upstart years, mind/ thought supervenience is still the best way for a physicalist to go the exclusion caper that plagues many accounts of mental causation. In section 3, I inject a form of mind/brain supervenience that depends crucially on the idea that some(a) brain state-types-namely, those involved in the production of goal-directed behavior-are nonlocally subtle, where by nonlocal predisposition I mean cases where applicable causal histories and environmental circumstances exit a difference in some of an organisms brain state-types intrinsic, causal properties. I will argue that such a vogue of sensitivity of brain state-types offers the best way dis cover of the exclusion task for anyone convinced that mental state-types should be comparatively individuated. IIn what follows, I examine the claim that mental causationat least for cases involving the production of purposive behavioris possible only if mind/brain supervenience obtains, and suggest that in spite of all the bad press it has received in recent years, mind/brain supervenience still is the best way for a physicalist to solve the exclusion problem that plagues many accounts of mental causation. In section III, I introduce a form of mind/brain supervenience that depends crucially on the idea that some brain state-typesnamely, those involved in the production of purposive behaviorare nonlocally sensitive, where by nonlocal sensitivity I understand cases where relevant causal histories and environmental circumstances effect a difference in some of an organisms brain state-types intrinsic, causal properties, and argue that such a mode of sensitivity of brain state-types offers the best way out of the exclusion problem for anyone convinced that mental state-types should be relationally individuated. (1) It is important to disclose from the outset that nonlocal sensitivity, as I understand it, is not equivalent to relational individuation. Indeed, I am not claiming that a change in a brain state-types relational properties effects a difference in its intrinsic, causal properties. I agree that brain state-types should be individuated nonrelationally, but introduce local and nonlocal sensitivity as modes of nonrelational individuation of brain state-types, and argue that nonlocally sensitive brain state-types make up the proper subvenient base for mental state-types. If my envision is correct, strong mind/brain supervenience is restored, and the exclusion problem solved.